Tag Archives: religious freedom

Trinity Lutheran Church vs Comer and the free exercise of religion

I have a confession to make. Reading the US Supreme Court’s ruling on Trinity Lutheran Church vs Comer, I am more persuaded by the majority decision written by Chief Justice Roberts than by Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. In this I differ from many secular campaign groups who deplore the ruling and are worried about what it might lead to.

In brief, Missouri runs a program using old tyres to improve children’s playgrounds. Trinity Lutheran Church asked to benefit from this. Their bid was rejected because it came from a church, in line with Missouri’s rule that no taxpayers’ money can go to a church. The Supreme Court ruled 7–2 that rejecting the bid simply because it came from a church violated the constitutional ban on laws “… prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. Sotomayor’s dissent, in contrast, focused on the other half of that clause, banning laws “respecting an establishment of religion”.

The two phrases together are commonly interpreted as erecting Jefferson’s “wall of separation” between churches and the government, preventing taxpayers money from going to churches and preventing the government from taxing churches.

But I think that another metaphor sums up religious freedom better, that of government blindness to religion. The government must be blind to religion, it cannot act with religious or anti-religious motive, it cannot favour religion, and it cannot disfavour religion.

Indeed, Jefferson also insisted (added emphasis):

“… that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of Religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge or affect their civil capacities”.

The Missouri program was open to bids from private schools and private day-care centers; the program had no religious intent, it was about recycling tyres and improving playgrounds. The fact that in one case the benefit would go to a day-care center run by a church is incidental. If that church were disqualified merely for being religious then their “civil capacities” would thereby have been “diminished”.

If a generally open program is off-limits to religious groups, but only to religious groups, then that seems a wrongful limitation of free exercise. I side with the majority ruling. The state of Missouri should have simply been blind to the religious nature of that applicant.

Equally, by this doctrine, however, religious institutions should not be exempted from taxation just because they are religious. They should be treated as any other private body.

Justice Sotomayor dissented from the ruling, expressing concern that the granting of money to a church would violate the “establishment of religion” clause, and citing a vast number of precedents where the funding of churches had been prohibited.

Yes, the grant would benefit a church, but that was not the intent of the program, and that is very different from establishing a program whose intent is to benefit a church (as in most of Sotomayor’s precedents).

The Establishment Clause is often expounded as the Lemon Test (which Sotomayor did not address directly in her dissent). The three-pronged test requires that: (1) a statute or government action must have a secular purpose (clearly the Missouri program did); (2) the principal or primary effect of the statute must not advance nor inhibit religion (any benefit to a church from the Missouri playground program was incidental, not a primary effect); and (3) the statute must not result in an “excessive government entanglement” with religion.

The third is the only one that the Missouri program could violate, but does a religion-blind policy where a religious institution could participate on equal terms with other private institutions really amount to “excessive entanglement”? Isn’t it just neutrality?

Sotomayor makes issue of the fact that Trinity Lutheran had not promised that it would not use the grant money for proselytising, instead of improving the playground, but presumably it would have done so if asked. Even as staunchly secular as I am, I could not find myself persuaded by Sotomayor’s arguments.

The judgement itself is fairly narrowly written, explicitly saying that it is not about taxpayers’ money going to activity that is itself religious, though the worry is that it could set a precedent that leads in that direction.

Could this lead to the courts ruling that the taxpayer must fund private religious schools on equal terms with state-funded public schools? Well, if a state instituted an open program where they would fund any school ran by anyone without any limitation on how the school operated or what was taught, then likely, yes, because of “free exercise”, that would have to include religious schools.

But surely no state government would run such a program; it would always take an interest in the quality of education and the curriculum it was paying for. The requirements for that would have to be secular (any religious component in the specifications would violate all three prongs of the Lemon Test), and that would prevent the state from paying for religious instruction.

Yes it is a worry what a highly religious and partisan court might do in the future, but in Trinity Lutheran I feel they made the right ruling that is most in line with the secular principles of religious freedom and religious equality.

I hope I’m not letting the side down too badly!

Updates: The Secular Coalition for America have said that:

“By deciding that churches are eligible for public grants, the court has empowered government employees and state lawmakers to decide which religious institutions ought to receive taxpayer money. This is precisely the entanglement of religion and government that the wall of separation between church and state is intended to safeguard against.”

That’s not really true. The government employees and state lawmakers could use only secular criteria in deciding which (religious) institutions receive taxpayer money, so there is little “entanglement”.

American Atheists say:

“Without the protection of these no-aid clauses, taxpayers are now being forced to directly subsidize religious denominations they do not support.”

But only to the extent that the program already supports other private groups. As the ruling points out, religious denominations already get the benefit of taxpayer-funded roads, police, fire brigades, et cetera.

The Freedom From Religion Foundation argue that:

“It has been a bright line rule since America’s founding that the government will not fund religion or the free exercise of religion. Today, the Supreme Court destroyed that rule …”

Well no, the ruling doesn’t mean that the government can fund religion, it means that the government can fund secular activity done by religious people.

This is strange, I would normally agree entirely with the above organisations. Am I wrong here?

Tim Farron’s resignation does not reveal secular intolerance

British Christians have been writing to the newspapers complaining that the resignation of Tim Farron as leader of the Liberal Democrats shows that liberal secularism has revealed itself to be intolerant. “We are kidding ourselves if we think we yet live in a tolerant, liberal society”, said Farron himself. The resignation “should make us wary of those who pretend to be tolerant and liberal” (Telegraph), “… is evidence of wider intolerance in British society” (Christian Institute) and “… symbolises the decay of liberalism” (New Statesman), opine others.

When Christians are unhappy it is usually because they are waking up to the fact that society is increasingly unwilling to grant them the special privileges to which they are accustomed, and to which they think they are entitled. The special privilege being asked for here is not that they be allowed to advance their beliefs in the public arena. That is accepted and not under threat by any secularist or Western atheist, however much Christians try to pretend otherwise. Rather, the special privilege being asked for is to advance such views and to have them exempted from critical scrutiny.

The suggestion that Christians can no longer hold high office in Britain is bizarre given that all recent Prime Ministers have been openly and vocally Christian. It is even more bizarre in a nation where families are routinely discriminated against by taxpayer-funded schools merely because they don’t go to church, where school pupils are legally required to worship the Christian god (!), and where Church of England bishops are given automatic places in the House of Lords.

Tim Farron, Liberal Democrat leader

I’ll also say this about Tim Farron. As an evangelical Christian he recognised that his religious views are minority ones within the UK, and thus quite genuinely did not want to impose them on others or on society at large. This contrasts with Theresa May who sees her Christianity as mainstream and as entitled to establishment privilege (despite the fact that only 4 per cent now attend church on a typical Sunday). Thus Theresa May, not Tim Farron, is the one trying to increase the amount of religious discrimination in state schools.

“No religious test” for public office is of course at the heart of liberal and secular principles. But “no religious test” is a restriction on the government; it is not a restriction on the people. In a democracy people must be allowed to consider someone’s opinions and views in deciding who to vote for. Indeed, isn’t that the whole point?

Christians want politicians to be open and vocal about their religious views, and are quite happy if that makes people more likely to vote for them, but where it makes people less likely to vote for someone they want to cry “Intolerance!”.

Tim Farron was leader of a party that promoted full equality for gay people. Yet it seems his private views are that a gay lifestyle is sinful and against Biblical teachings. People, understandably, questioned him about that discrepancy.

That is not “intolerant”, it is simply asking for consistency. If the leader of the Conservative Party, publicly promoting a free-market economy, revealed that in private they were actually a Marxist, there would be just as many questions!

It was Tim Farron himself who considered that his public role, leading a “progressive, liberal party in 2017”, had become incompatible with what he saw as “living as a committed Christian” and “hold[ing] faithfully to the Bible’s teaching”. That is a contradiction he really should have sorted out for himself before running for public office. People are entitled to hold compartmentalised and inconsistent views; but voters are entitled to take note.

To claim that tolerance demands that the media and public just ignore such inconsistencies is to ask that religious beliefs be granted a very special status where they be exempt from scrutiny, a status where voters may react favourably to religious views but may not react unfavourably. There is nothing illiberal in rejecting that request.

Can we please distinguish between speech and actions?

The distinction between speech and action matters. Shouting fire in a crowded theatre endangers people’s safety and so is not just speech but also an “action” that can rightfully be outlawed. In contrast, showing contempt by burning the US flag or a copy of the Quran is “speech” and so should not be outlawed. The act of burning an item of your own property is lawful, and the added contemptuous attitude amounts to speech. This is highlighted by the fact that the method of disposal of old flags recommended by the US military is … burning them, though respectfully. Likewise some Islamic authorities recommend burning as the method of disposal of old copies of the Quran that are no longer fit for reading.

Those in favour of free speech generally hold that any speech that stops short of incitement to violence, or otherwise putting people in direct physical danger, should be lawful and accepted. Those against free speech think otherwise. But they don’t want to admit to being against free speech; few people do. So they label those in favour of free speech as “free speech absolutists”, and begin their arguments with: “I am fully in favour of free speech, but …”. From there they muddy the water by trying to negate the distinction between speech and action. Continue reading

No “reasonable accommodation” for religion!

equal-logoBaroness O’Neill, chair of the UK’s Equality and Human Rights Commission, has recently given a speech, hosted by the Theos think tank, on freedom of expression and religion of religion. There is much that is good in the speech. In particular I agree wholeheartedly with her view that:

There is no way of securing freedom of expression if we also maintain that there is a right not to be offended. Speech acts that incite hatred, or that intimidate, or that defraud, or that abuse, can be regulated without putting freedom of expression at the mercy of others. But if there were a right not to be offended, this would put everyone’s freedom of expression at the mercy of others.

Baroness O’Neill counsels:

What then should one do if one hears, reads or sees something that one considers offensive, perhaps deeply offensive? The basic thing is to remember is that unless the offending speech act was wrong in some further way (e.g. it was defamatory, or incited hatred, or was fraudulent), no right has been violated, and no remedy of the sort that respect for rights requires is needed.

But, there is one major area where I want to argue that Baroness O’Neil is misguided. And this is the fundamental matter of what we mean by “freedom of religion”. The Baroness says that: Continue reading

The Chapel Hill shooting, Craig Hicks’s anti-theism, and The Guardian’s biases

In the heightened tension of multiple shootings related to religion and free-speech there is sometimes a tendency to claim that vocal atheists can be just as “extreme” as the Islamists. In Craig Hicks, murderer of three innocent people who were Muslims, perhaps there is the proof?

The Guardian certainly thinks so. In an editorial published yesterday, The Guardian says that the Chapel Hill shooting was an “act of terrorism” and that Hicks’s target was “freedom itself”, in this case the freedom to be a Muslim.

We should and do unreservedly condemn the murders of Deah Barakat, of Yusor Mohammad Abu-Salha, and of Razan Mohammad Abu-Salha, the youngest only 19. If the act was in any way related to the atheistic views of Craig Hicks then we unreservedly condemn it. If the motive was unrelated to religion we again condemn it.

The Guardian thinks it knows Craig Hicks’s motives, but does it? Hicks has been described as “an angry, confrontational man who constantly harangued residents about where they parked their car and the noise level at the condominium complex where they lived”. Hicks was also an advocate of the right to carry guns, which on occasion he brandished to neighbours.

The families of those murdered regard this as a hate crime, directed at the victims because they were Muslim. They may be right. Hicks’s wife, though, has denied that the motive was religious. Mental health issues have been suggested. Many people are gunned down in gun-toting America each year. The fact that the victims were religious is not sufficient for concluding that the motive was religious. Continue reading

Mainstream Islam is not moderate

As I write this thousands of Muslims are marching through London to “Defend the Honour of the Holy Prophet” and denounce the “insulting depictions of our Holy Prophet” by Charlie Hebdo.

They have every right to do so, of course. They have every right to voice their views, even though they would deny that right to others, if they could. It is also entirely within their rights to regard this issue as a more urgent reason for taking to the streets than, for example, the activities of ISIS. Does burning people to death, beheading children, and selling girls as sex slaves — when done in the name of Islam by the Islamic State — not demean the honour of the Prophet of Islam?

The media are quick to label ISIS and their fellow Jihadi Islamists as extremists, which they certainly are. But the implication is that mainstream Islam is moderate. Let’s consider some basic principles of any “moderate” worldview in the West nowadays. Continue reading

Dear Muslims, about Muhammed cartoons

Islam star and crescentI am the sort of person who would draw a Mohammed cartoon, if I could draw, which I can’t, and if I was good at satirical cartoons, which I’m not. Yes, we do understand that you find cartoons depicting Muhammed offensive. We understand that you value the reputation of Muhammed more than that of your own family, and that Western cartoons about your prophet are, to you, utterly disrespectful and blasphemous. We are not drawing cartoons just for the sake of being insulting, nor because we hate you. We draw cartoons because we regard doing so as important for a free society.

Over human history many ideologies have been totalitarian. The Christian religion used to burn people at the stake for heresy. The Soviet Communists sent people to the Gulag for any dissent from communist ideology. The Nazis murdered millions to further their fascist ideology.

All totalitarian regimes control what people can say, and in particular they repress any questioning of themselves and their control of society. The right to question authority is among the most fundamental rights in a free society. Even the right to vote is predicated on the right to discuss and argue about the merits and demerits of the government. Where people cannot question their rulers, society is not free. And that means, overwhelmingly, that economic prosperity is lower, technological advance is hampered, cultural flourishing is restricted, and quality of life is lower. Across the world these things correlate with political freedom and thus with freedom of speech.

The Islamic world, sadly, is different. Political freedom is not accepted. Rather, the greatest good is held to be unquestioning acceptance of Islam. Where Islam dominates, Islam is totalitarian, controlling what people can do and say. Continue reading